Our Climate is Changing - Are you ready to get involved supporting your State?

U.S. State local governments are rising to the challenge of preparing for the inevitable climate changes they anticipate having to contend with forward going.

By Katherine Pratt

It appears that for some time now, every three years all our States submit their State Plans to the Government on the state of their energy, agriculture, population, and probably for most areas for which the Government has over-sight.

The Government in turn requests information from each of their departments and every three years, they publish this in a comprehensive format addressing all of the important areas such as:

Water Resources Energy	Energy and Land Use
Urban Infrastructure	Indigenous Peoples
Biochemical Cycles	Rural Communities
All the US Regions, Oceans and Marine resources, and our Coasts

In looking over all the new climate change initiatives recently released by all our States and our Government, there appear to be a few important omissions.

There does not appear to be any published mention of using metrics usually applied in Support Engineering, such as reliability, maintainability, or sustainability, (RMS) and even logistics is not mentioned. I suspect this omission exists because much of what the Government is currently requesting from the States and subsequently is publishing, is meant simply to inform, and is not designed to specifically formulate solutions.

Even though they are including climate change impacts into their US National Climate Assessment, supported by the US Global Change Research Program, they have not yet made the practical decision to begin to use the metrics needed to engineer the solutions to these problems, which affect all of us.

They also specifically mention they have data gaps for the Pacific Islands, Puerto Rico, and other U.S. Territories in their most recent publication: "NCA3 Climate Change Impacts in the United States"

These are just some of the indicators measured globally over many decades that show that the Earth’s climate is warming. White arrows indicate increasing trends, and black arrows indicate decreasing trends. All the indicators expected to increase in a warming world are, in fact, increasing, and all those expected to decrease in a warming world are decreasing. (Figure source: NOAA NCDC based on data updated from Kennedy et al. 20101).

You probably noticed in your own State that they are beginning to address these environmental issues. If they have not begun to use the metrics of reliability, maintainability or sustainability (RMS) in addressing their solutions, then they have not taken into account the value of applying logistics-based solutions for the larger tasks they will undoubtedly need this type of structured planning forward going.

Most, if not all States have now begun to address Climate Change, its’ current status and how it will affect them in forward going. The Maryland Commission on Climate Change is charged with advising the Governor and General Assembly on ways to mitigate the causes of, prepare for, and adapt to the consequences of climate change and maintaining and strengthening the state’s existing Greenhouse Gas Reduction Plan (GHG Plan).

A Steering Committee and four working groups currently support the Commission. The Adaptation and Response Working Group (ARWG) is charged with developing a Comprehensive Strategy for Reducing Maryland’s Climate Change vulnerability. The Strategy includes both short and long-term measures that State and local governments may undertake in planning for and adapting to diverse impacts of climate change.

A priority for the ARWG in 2017 will be to seek opportunities to broaden stakeholder representation to include business, organized labor and industry representatives, along with local and federal partners with specific expertise in or understanding of the areas of the ARWG’S work.

In addition to the work that the ARWG members are already doing in response to Phase I and Phase II strategies, the Adaptation and Response Working Group (AWRG) has identified the following cross-cutting priorities to focus on in 2017 and 2018:

1. Evaluating New Sea Level Rise Science ~ Scientific understanding of the causes and rates of sea-level rise is rapidly evolving. 
2. Broadening the Adaptation Scope ~ As the focus of the ARWG, its members’ work and the challenges of different climate impacts evolve, the working group is recommending that additional emphasis be placed on meeting adaptation needs in non-coastal areas and on non-flooding issues such as extreme heat events, which are forecast to become more common. Through its Coast Smart Construction Program, Maryland is already a leader in ensuring that state investments will be resilient to the impacts of sea-level rise and coastal flooding. 
3. Healthy Soils Initiative ~ Soils are already huge stores of carbon, and improved management of this resource could expand their capacity for carbon storage. ARWG will promote innovations in soil sequestration technologies, as well as, seek ways to improve how their implementation is integrated into climate change adaptation. 
4.  Local Comprehensive Plan for Adaptation Research ~ Local governments and communities will play a key role in successful adaptation. Many adaptation interventions necessary to increasing resilience are often squarely in the purview of local governments, including zoning codes, floodplain management, and building codes. 
5. Resilience Financing Stress Test ~ Communities are faced with the dual challenge of effectively managing and protecting important natural resources while at the same time preparing their communities to address the impacts and risks of climate change. In addition to identifying the financing structures at the community level through the stress test, the ARWG will investigate incentive programs and opportunities within the insurance industry as well as the role that state and federal governments can play to ease the finance burdens of adaptation. 
6. Metrics for Tracking Progress ~ Adaptation efforts are only useful if they work, but states and other actors often lack defined methods for evaluating responses and monitoring success. Without easily measurable benefits (at least in the short-term) the state faces difficulty in building understanding for adaptation policies and investments. (This is an excellent area in which to use RMS metrics.)
7. Georgetown Climate Center Recommendations ~ The purpose of Georgetown Climate Center's 2016 report was to help the ARWG document the important work it is already doing to prepare for the impacts of climate change and to provide recommendations and examples of other practices being implemented in other states as suggestions for additional steps that the state could take. SCHEDULE OF MEETINGS Appendix C of this document provides a summary of ARWG meetings scheduled for 2017, as well as tentative topics and MCCC work items. (See link in # 8 below)
8. ECO Meetings ~The ECO meetings are held monthly at the Maryland Department of the Environment. These meetings are open to the public and a portion of each meeting is set aside for public comment.  The time, date and location for all Maryland Commission on Climate Change, Steering Committee and Working Group meetings may be found on the MCCC Calendar. 

With your working knowledge of these Support Engineering concepts,’ practices and metrics plus a desire to be part of the solution, there are likely many ways for you to become involved in your State to ensure your State properly plans and prepares, and implements RMS-based solutions forward–going.  If you are looking for way to be part of the climate change solution, this is an excellent way forward to a productive and meaningful service to our Country.

Sustainability: A Technological and Budget Issue for the Defense Department

In the scheme of things, a system’s total life cycle management planning for sustainment as a post-production to retirement activity is a normal part of the cradle to grave design and fielding package(s).  It involves ensuring there is, for example, adequate depot maintenance, sufficient spare inventory, technical service supervision and, often, a sufficiency of private sector repair and overall facilities until a system’s predicated retired. Unfortunately, technological and financial challenges surface within the DoD community when the useful life of systems is extended far beyond their date of planned obsolesces. Further complicating the issue is the fact that legacy systems remain in needed use during an era when the technological change cycle, in many instances, is 12 months or less and when the battle space has taken on asymmetrical cyber warfare characteristics.

The issue of aging systems is a major challenge for a number of reasons. It is, in most cases, not in the financial interest of industry to maintain obsolete systems and related inventory of spares for a diminishing number of items with questionable longevity.  For industry to do so would place them at a competitive disadvantage at a time when the evolution of technology is becoming increasingly sophisticated, of shorter duration and more complex with each iteration.

New system and component technology is often more reliable, smaller, lighter in design and operates more efficiently than systems and components they are to replace. Therefore from a financial perspective, manufacturers will invest their time and resources in designing and building systems with advanced technologies for expanding sales opportunities rather than on supporting legacy systems that can, at anytime, be eliminated with the swipe of a Congressional pen.  In addition, legacy systems and components may not play nicely with advanced replacement technologies.  For legacy systems that have not been designed for the insertion and use of advance technologies (i.e. not having a common backplane) often experience interface and interoperability issues and have proven to be a major readiness challenge for the DoD community.

There are other issues associated with the rapid turnover of technology that continue to challenge the DoD community. The public marketplace expectations for innovative technologies, especially in software, often means that by the time a product reaches the end of its initial production run it is obsolete. Therefore, since the lifecycle use of the product is relatively short, industry has little, if any, incentive to invest in long-term product reliability.  The burning question: why design in systems with long-term reliability and availability when a systems’ and/or equipments’ useful life will only be one production run? In short, it is not in the competitive financial interest of corporate America.

Unlike the public sector that has the resources and flexibility to purchase products as they role off the production line, DoD strategic, economic, and mission requirements prevent investing in and purchasing advanced technology repeatedly on a short time schedule.  The DoD acquisition process has a series of reviews and safeguards tied to Congressional mandates that usually cause the purchase of systems/equipment to be deliberately slow.  Equally important is the fact that the DoD is much larger and more complex than any one single corporate entity within the private sector.  It is responsible for the training and equipping hundreds, if not thousands of troops, deployed worldwide in the use of new technologies.  Introducing new replacement equipment into the Services every year or two would create a logistics and training nightmare that would potentially leave very few funds available to DoD for other defense priorities.

Twenty first century battlespace complexity and variation requires a mixed use of systems containing innovative technologies along with legacy systems.  Laser and acoustic weapon systems, for example, often are required to reside in the same space and time as the fifty-caliber machine gun.  In addition, the battle space terrain keeps shifting. It can simply be confined to a remote village in Africa under terrorist occupation or can include nation-state and asymmetrical challenges from land to sea, to air, to space to cyber, from urban to desert environments, to a dense jungle environment or a combination of all. 

As current worldwide urban conflicts have demonstrated, conventional urban warfare frequently requires “boots on the ground” in close combat situations. The use of conventional legacy systems tends to remain the weapon systems in use under this condition.  Rifles, tanks, mortars, grenades can seldom be substituted with drones, tactical nuclear weapons, laser guided missions, computer-cyber programs and other similar advanced technologies for many regional conflicts that are challenging the national security of the U.S.  Certainly advanced technologies can and do play a much needed support role within the conventional battle space however, it is conventional systems, many which are legacy, in the hands of seasoned troops that win and hold territory.  This scenario creates a huge sustainment challenge for the DoD. Under such unpredictable circumstances the end cost(s) of the logistic complexity and sustainability of legacy systems is potentially damaging to our national defense and economy.

Many of the legacy systems, by definition, continue to be used far beyond their designed intended useful life.  The older these systems, the less reliable they become (they break down often), parts become scarce, the more costly it becomes for maintenance facilities, equipment repair and maintenance personnel, and from a War fighter perspective, the less confidence they have that the legacy systems will keep them out of harms way.  The sustainment of obsolete systems can be costly in many ways, to include using taxpayer resources that can be put to better use in defense of our county. 

The time has come for DoD to develop and implement a comprehensive life cycle sustainment policy that addresses such matters as cost and part obsolesces for both legacy systems and newer systems that eventually will pass beyond their intended design life.  Essential legacy systems and critical parts have to be identified and supported until there is an established, well-planned date for their replacement.  Contracts for new systems need to include robust provisions for sustainment. DoD needs to do a better job in anticipating what legacy and new systems will be needed in the present and future battle space and firm, insightful cost sustainment metrics have to be developed so that provisions for a long-term, life cycle sustainment budget can be established.  To do otherwise, makes the sustainment of legacy systems cost prohibitive, impedes their replacement and consumes DoD limited resources that are needed to be used in other ways to confront the global defense challenges of this century.   

The Value of Receiving a Higher Education in the illities and Related Engineering Disciplines

by Russell A. Vacante, Ph.D.

With the ever-increasing cost of higher education and waning opportunities to realize a lucrative technological career, many students, especially those who are U.S native born, are steering their higher education sights away from a career in engineering.  Among those students who do pursue a formal education, few are actively seeking out courses of study in reliability, maintainability, supportability, logistics and systems engineering.  The reasons are many, however, they all boil down to “there’s little perceived return on investment.”

Newspaper articles and  television news programs frequently report on the increasing number of students graduating from college with huge student loan debt; a financial burden that follows them well into their adult life.  The repayment of their educational debt and the interest incurred, in many instances, is large enough to adversely impact their quality of life, e.g., marriage planning, purchasing homes, automobiles and more.  Exasperating as the repayment of student loans issue is, the opportunity to find well paying jobs upon graduating from college that will help to mitigate the economic burden of repaying their student loans is on the wane.  While it remains relatively accurate that students with engineering degrees often have a starting wage higher than their classmates graduating with non-technical degrees, it is also correct to say that well paying engineering jobs are increasingly becoming a scarce commodity. This is especially true for engineers specializing in “the illities,” e.g., reliability, maintainability supportability and logistics.  All of this leads us the next related subject to be discussed.

The cost(s) to run DoD cost and industry profits have increasingly been the driving force for acquisition reform and industry consolidation. This trend most likely began with The Packard Commission (1985) report on management and decision-making issues, gained momentum with the National Performance Review (1993) that promoted the commercial use of standards, followed by the Rumsfeld’s Challenge (2001) that underscored issues with an expanding DoD infrastructure and advances in industry technology outpacing the need within the DoD.

Most recently the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, The Honorable Frank Kendall, wrote in the Forward of the Performance of the Defense Acquisition System, 2014 Annual Report the following: “Most of the development and production on acquisition programs is conducted by industry under contract to the government. Therefore, we examine various incentive techniques to see how effective they are at driving cost, schedule, and technical performance.”  All suggesting that from 1985 to present the emphasis within DoD has been to increasingly shift DoD acquisition and technology tasks to industry, i.e., as means to reduce defense expenditures and remain on the cutting edge of advancing technologies.  How’s this working for us at a time when other advanced and advancing nation-states are graduating more engineers from college in one year than the U.S. graduates in ten years?

As I have discussed in a prior newsletter editorial, despite the numerous acquisition reform measures implemented by DoD during the last thirty years, disappointing performance, cost overruns and schedule delays remain a persistent nemesis of the DoD acquisition system.  The migration of DoD acquisition, technology knowledge, expertise and responsibility to industry, in many instances, has not streamlined the procurement of major weapon systems.  As DoD continues working at bringing down the cost of doing business, industry is also on a never ending quest to increase its profit margins.  It is well known within the industry defense community that senior technical employees frequently are among the first to get furloughed as a cost reduction or profit seeking measure while individuals with less experience and education are frequently retained or hired to assume the responsibilities and duties of those they have replaced.

The goal to make DoD more efficient while industry partners remain profitable is a notable endeavor. However, to do so at the expense of formal education and technical training in the engineering illities and technical fields in general is misguided. For example, the on-going DoD sequester has significantly reduced DoD and industry support of formal education and on-the- job training.  This is occurring at a period in U.S. history when the defense challenge from other countries appears to be escalating.  This seems to be a counter-intuitive approach to acquisition reform and national defense.  While the cost of promoting and supporting formal education and technical training in engineering and related illities initially may be more expensive, in terms of total life cycle cost savings, it will be proven to be cost effective to DoD in terms of providing systems with improved performance, fewer cost overruns and timely deliveries. 

It is important to note that lack of student interest in subjects such as reliability, maintainability, supportability/ sustainability and logistics is not what caused students to avoid pursuing an engineering degree.  It is low wages, questionable employment opportunity or well-paying jobs and long term, secure employment opportunities are influencers for them to seek other career alternatives.  Less focus on government cost savings and industry profit margins would be good for the engineering profession, educational institution and our national defense.

DoD is a large enough proverbial dog to wag the tail of industry with respect to establishing educational priorities within the DoD community.  When DoD leadership acknowledges the importance of and need for reliability engineers and related technical disciplines, industry will also make education and training a higher priority for its workforce.  As a positive consequence, colleges and universities will have an incentive to grow their engineering programs and students will once again view engineering as an intellectually fulfilling and economically promising career.

On the Potential Brink of Chaos – the Korean Peninsula

by Russell A. Vacante, Ph.D.

To say that there are a number of political-military threatening activities in the world today that have the potential of endangering the national security of many Asian nations, especially the Republic of Korea (ROK), does not come as a surprise to many political observers.  These menacing political-military activities spring up at a time the political, economic and military resources of the United States are stretched and when U.S. citizens have a low tolerance for foreign additional military engagements.  The American public is close to being psychologically exhausted from seeing so many of its youth return home from distant shores in body bags, with missing limbs and other seriously injuries.  This disposition is exasperated by the huge economic strain placed on the wallets and purse strings of U.S. citizens who see only a questionable return on their international military investment.  This is a circumstance that some totalitarian regimes recognize and are ready to exploit.  This psychological and economic strain currently being experienced by the American public certainly is not going unnoticed by Kim Jong Un and the military leaders of North Korea.  The Kim regime is an astute observer of American military capabilities and the U.S. national political climate.  They are also opportunists that will attempt to leverage any perceived lack of U.S. political will into military gains on the Korean peninsula.  From their ethnocentric position in world politics they are following socio-political events in the U.S. as a potential means to acquire a tactical military advantage on the Korean peninsula.   

The conflict between Israel and Hamas fighters over control of the Gaza Stripe has become a daily preoccupation of the U.S. President, Congress, and many American citizens.  It has Secretary of State Kerry doing shuttle diplomacy to the Middle East in an attempt to broker a cease-fire between two archenemies that for centuries, in one way or another, have been at war with each other.  The potential of this Middle East conflict globally escalating is real, therefore there is a pressing U.S. government sense urgency to stop the violence and have the two sides reach some sort of peaceful accord for the sake of all non-citizen combatants. The longer this conflict continues the higher the potential risk to U.S. national security.  As an allied of Israel, there are a growing number of folks in the Arab world that view the U.S. as being partially responsible for the killing and maiming of Gaza Strip residences and the destruction of their homes by Israel’s motor shells and bombs.  This Arab perception, legitimate or not, puts the U.S. in direct conflict with much of the Arab world that may seek retaliation against the U.S. for its support of Israel.  This looming threat to U.S national security is just one of numerous other Middle East conflicts stretching the political energy, as well as, the economic resources of the U.S. government and citizens.  The relatively sudden and surprising emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) that is currently capturing and holding large pieces of real estate in Iraq and Syria appears to over take political priorities the U.S. has concerning the Gaza Strip.    

The Russian Prime Minster, Vladimir Putin, aggressive designs toward the Ukraine is another political destabilizing event that the U.S. (with allies) is attempting to address without getting militarily caught up in a major conflict that has a potential of resulting in a show down between the world’s two largest nuclear powers.  U.S. and European sanctions, thus far have not acted as a successful deterrent in quelling the territorial conflict between Ukrainians and Russian separatist living in Ukraine who are armed and reportedly supported by the Russian military.  Russia’s military aggression in Ukraine is largely based on Putin’s understanding that much of Europe is dependent on Russian oil and that Russia is Europe’s third largest trading partner.   Putin sees the U.S. imposed sanctions only as a minor economic irritant while knowing there is much internal economic leverage to be gained from making the Ukraine a subservient state of Russia.  Putin’s move on Ukraine is further fueled by his ambition to restore his nation to former Soviet Union world power status.  If this activity strains U.S. – Russian relations to the point rekindling Cold War relationship, to the determinant of current cooperative endeavors between the two counties, Putin seems willing to take this risk.  In the event the U.S. cannot, through diplomatic channels, persuade Putin from “annexing” the Ukraine, the only remaining course of action may be providing heavy weapons support to the Ukraine.  However, Putin—in a similar way to Kim Jong Un --is also reading the preverbal political and economic tealeaves in the U.S.  He is counting U.S. citizen distain for additional international military involvement and the U.S.  government preoccupation with the Middle East conflict as a green light for pressing on with an invasion of the Ukraine.

China’s growing military is a third global destabilizing force that the U.S. has to prepare potentially to confront. Similar to Putin’s quest for the recreation of the Soviet Union, the Chinese government also seems to be looking to the past to shape its future.  It may not be an intellectual exaggeration to suggest that China longs for recapturing its Middle Kingdom status to which its neighboring countries would once again pay it tribute to China. 

China’s expanding naval activity on the East China Sea, to include laying claim unpopulated islands govern by Japan, and its growing territorial tensions with Malaysia, the Philippines, and Viet Nam all seem to indicate Middle Kingdom type aspirations.  Diminishing or eliminating U.S. naval dominance of the sea is first necessary for China’s hegemony of East Asia to succeed.  The challenge to U.S. naval dominance comes in the form of roaming trucks equipped DF-21D, 900 mile range missiles that pose a threat to U.S. aircraft carries.  China’s development of an aircraft carrier fleet and the development reportedly of supersonic submarines that can reach the west coast of the U.S. in just over two hours is another threat to U.S. naval superiority on the high seas. The rapidly expanding naval resources of China are its attempt to capture control of East China Sea trading lanes.  China’s dominance over regional sea commerce is threat to U.S. national security interest.  Its control of East China Sea lanes would potentially impose trading restrictions U.S trade with its allies, as well as, potentially interfere with American-Korean joint military exercises in the region.  More immediate U.S. concern is that China’s aggressive growing naval activity could accidently, or intentionally, results in the killing and injuring of American sailors and marines.   Such an incident would mostly likely result in an U.S. military response that in turn may result in escalating war tensions between the two nations. Defusing China’s “Middle Kingdom” aspirations is increasing becoming diplomatic priority of the U.S. State Department and U.S. citizens.

Of course there are the conflicts in Syria, the menacing political and military activity of Iran, along with genocide taking place throughout various parts of Africa that all tend to drain the energy, attention, and time of U.S. government officials, as well as, U.S. economic and military resources.  As a world leading power, the U.S. is busily challenged with putting its preverbal fingers in so many Middle East political dikes in order to help prevent neighboring nations from drowning in military chaos.  The ominous U.S. political situations mentioned above, Kim Jong Un may believe, has the potential for creating chaos for the Republic of Korea (ROK).

The leadership of north Korea may try to seize upon the opportunity to ferment political and military unrest within the ROK mistakenly thinking that the U.S. resolve to defense the ROK has been weakened by recent international events.  Also, north Korea knowledge of China’s increased military presence in the region may lead the DPRK to falsely assume U.S. military defense of the ROK would not occur due to Chinese intervention.   Given the political disposition of north Korea’s government and the global challenges confronting the U.S. this year, the chances of north Korea stepping up its political and military campaign again the ROK has a high probability of increasing.   Kim Jong Un and his military leaders should understand that the U.S. anticipates what the Pyongyang leadership is thinking and that the U.S. and Korean governments will not be taken by surprise by any attempts of military aggression coming from the north.

Aside from the U.S. anticipating and being prepared for any potential military aggression from north Korea, let it be known that while the American public through war wryly, is far from being too preoccupied to come to the defense the ROK, our long standing ally.  Our people and cultures are interwoven much so that an attack on one party is an attack on the other.

Korean culture has emerged, in recent years, as a major subculture in the U.S.  There is respect, feelings of friendship and admiration among many Americans for the Korean community living within the U.S. and in the ROK. Korean and American soldiers fought and died together during the Korean War, the Viet Nam conflict and at other global hot spots.  Any military intrusion from north Korea that endangers the well being of one of America’s staunches friend and ally would not be taken likely.  Endemic to American culture is the willingness of its people to come to the aid of others, especially when those in danger are endearing friends.  There is much economically and politically more at stake for the ROK and the U.S. now then there was during the 1950-1953 Korean War, so the north should realize that the ROK-US military response to any military aggression will be of a different kind and intensity.       

Defense & Auto Industries: Peas in the Same Pod?

by Russell A. Vacante, Ph.D.

There is one high level or “big picture” characteristic that has contributed to current global competitive difficulties for both the U.S. auto and defense industries, and it is this - a resistance to promoting and embracing change.

   

From an institutional perspective, managing and implementing change involves a willingness of senior leaders to recognize and accept the impact of new influences, e.g., globalization and technological advances. Since these influences are, for the most part, “external” to an organization, successful implementation requires that they be accepted and managed “internally.” This is where the “rub,” or primary challenge, is found. The structure, culture, deep-rooted processes and routines of an organization’s leadership can be the biggest hurdle to accepting and adopting new influences.  This is particularly evident in both the U.S. automobile and defense industries, where leadership often resists the need for change when new influences come up against “the way it has always been done.”

Many professionals within the automobile and defense industries are familiar with the challenges associated with career development.  Employees know that in order to be promoted they are expected to regularly attend change management and technical training sessions. The employer’s intention is: employee training will serve to keep the organization competitive, particularly when it comes to technological advancements.  A partial reason for this is training sessions don’t usually require organizations to make huge financial investments and employee’s training opportunities can, and often are, turned off and on at will.  Conversely, employees are at the beck and call of their employers when it pertains to training.  Often the employees return to the workplace with knowledge and information from a training session that will prove beneficial to their organization and possibly to their career, if properly implemented.  However, it should not be a surprise to most that employee recommended changes frequently are not implemented by the employer.  Conversely, employers often blame employees for the inability of their organization to accommodate change.  For the sake of our discussion, let’s call institutional change initiated or suggested by employees “micro” organizational change. With this said, it is acknowledged that instances of micro organizational change, that is, change from the bottom up, rarely occur.

Change at the macro institutional level, i.e., top down, is more likely to occur than change from the bottom up.  When macro changes do occur within an organization, it usually is at a snail’s pace.  For instance, the U.S. automobile industry’s reluctance to retool its factories to accommodate “green” technology continues to keep it at a competitive disadvantage to foreign auto makers, in particular, Japan and Germany. Maintaining the status quo seems to be the modus operandi of U.S. auto makers, an industry whose leadership, incrementally and slowly, implements change only after serious competitive coercion from the marketplace forces. 

The U.S. automobile industry’s precipitous decline in the global marketplace began years ago and parallels Japan’s auto industry's accession in the international automobile market. Leading Japan’s charge to change were two change management advocates, Deming and Taguchi.  The Japanese auto industry's willingness to accommodate macro organizational change, based on their recommendations, led to significant product improvements in quality and reliability.  Thus,   Japanese vehicles became more reliable, easier to maintain and support than U.S. automobiles and as a result captured the buying public’s attention and dollars. Japan’s automobile initiative towards producing “greener” cars is the proverbial frosting on the cake that will help the Japanese auto industry guarantee customer satisfaction well into the future.

It also comes as no surprise to professionals within the government that change does not come easy to the U.S. defense industry.  Cost overruns, schedule delays, and poor performance of many defense systems can be attributed to institutional resistance to change.  The defense establishment, government and private industry alike, often requires its employees to be flexible.   In place of recognizing the necessity of making important institutional changes the defense industry seemingly laboriously develops and implements new policy and procedural reforms in accordance to which way the political winds are blowing in Washington D.C.  We have seen the demise of the Willoughby templates and experienced standardization reform, and have endured numerous other “reforms” to the DoD 5000 document series.  Our collective attention to the addressing of institutional changes has been ignored, in large part, due to our preoccupation with implementing micro level “reforms.”  The Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L), Frank Kendall, memorandum dated August 21, 2014 and the accompanying guidance entitled “Guidelines for Creating and Maintaining a Competitive Environment for Supplies and Services in the Department of Defense” apparently is a micro, as opposed to a macro, attempt once again at acquisition reform.

Similar to the U.S. automobile makers who have lost the attention and “voice” of the customer, the U.S. defense industry appears to have lost the message regarding present and future global defense challenges.  The defense community has spent years reforming administrative policies and procedures that have resulted in questionable results.  Little, if any, measurable progress has been made towards controlling cost overruns, reducing schedule delays and improving system requirements definition and associated performance.  With this said, let us hope that the Kendall’s recent reform measures, at a minimum, help control escalating acquisition cost. However, a macro initiative probably would include a new management approach for also controlling schedule and performance. The Japanese automakers implemented macro institutional change that has led to improved quality and reliability of their automobiles - could this be a lesson to the U.S. automobile and defense industries?

            The fundamental story line in this editorial is - the U.S. automobile and defense industry’s resistance to change is proving to be an important factor in contributing to their global competitive decline. Books have been written that cite the causes of institutional resistance to change; issues covered in these books include changing educational priorities, changing work ethics and entrenched leadership and outdated organizational values and interests.  Most literature of this nature leads us down the path of micro level reform as opposed to macro level institutional change and often is written by “experts” who have long-standing and vested interests in prevailing institutional structures.  We cannot expect these experts to recommend an “out with the old and in with the new” approach to any organization.  As a result, their micro advocacy to change reinforces the automobile and defense industry’s “bandage” approach to correcting organizational deficiencies, while missing the opportunity for macro institutional change that can improve their global competitiveness.

To meet the competitive challenges of the 21^st century the U.S. automobile and defense industries need to embrace macro rather than micro institutional change.  Institutions that refuse to change get sidelined or die.  The U.S. steel industry is a shadow of its previous self and unless the U.S. auto and defense industry leadership begins focusing on making more macro level changes they will likely suffer a similar demise.